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The Joint Munitions Command (JMC) provides bombs and bullets to U.S. forces—all 
Services and all types of conventional ammunition from bunker-buster bombs to rifle 
rounds. The JMC manages the plants that produce more than 1.6 billion rounds of 
ammunition annually and the depots that store the nation’s ammunition for training and 
combat. The JMC is currently accountable for $30 billion of munitions and missiles.  For 
about 30 years the JMC used the Commodity Command Standard System to manage its 
inventory and the Standard Depot System to administer depot-level maintenance 
operations.  In 1999 the JMC initiated an effort to replace those antiquated systems with 
the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), an enterprise resource planning system that 
held the promise of reducing inventory, improving forecast planning for supply and 
demand, and providing a single source of data for decision-making by transforming 
logistics operations in six core processes: order fulfillment, supply and demand planning, 
procurement, asset management, materiel maintenance, and financial management.  In 
2010 the JMC finally fielded the LMP.  However, a variety of factors have prevented the 
JMC from fully benefiting from the LMP’s promised functionality, especially the fight to 
achieve and maintain data quality.   
This study examines published data quality records to identify data quality 
patterns or trends that exist in component organizations of the JMC and links them to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The importance of this project is tied to the notion that data is as important as 
ammunition.  In the same way that faulty ammunition can bring a ruinous outcome to an 
otherwise perfect mission, poor data quality can lead to disastrous results.  Conversely, accurate 
data can lay the foundation for smarter decision-making at all levels of an organization.  Good 
data is especially critical in the business of logistics—a primary activity within the Joint 
Munitions Command (JMC). 
The author’s efforts in researching this thesis focused on data quality measurements 
obtained from the JMC Enterprise Integration Data Team, which has been charged with creating 
and publishing accuracy measurements for all critical data objects and with establishing 
consistent business rules to be applied and communicated to all sites within the JMC.  These 
sites include Letterkenny Munitions Center, Blue Grass Army Depot, McAllister Army 
Ammunition Plant, Tooele Army Depot, Crane Army Ammunition Activity, and Pine Bluff 
Arsenal.  Although regularly scheduled audits are performed by the cognizant business process 
owners at each of the JMC component organizations on a variety of production-related business 
elements (such as routes, planographs, bills of material, etc.), the author has limited the scope of 
this study to audits of bills of material (BOM) data.  
A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The author’s purpose in this study was to determine the existence of data quality patterns 
or trends in component organizations of the JMC. In order to make this determination, the author 
studied data quality records of the various JMC components and qualified the data defects by 
category.  Based on the data qualifications, the author was able to make strategic 
recommendations for reducing data defects across the JMC enterprise. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to accomplish the goal of this research, three major questions must be answered: 
• Can the data quality data be qualified in any meaningful way? 
• Are there data quality trends or patterns that exist within the JMC? 
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• Can a strategy be applied that will reduce data defects across the JMC enterprise? 
C. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
Today’s U.S. armed forces rely heavily on information to win the fight in a battle space 
that encompasses land, air, sea, space, and now cyberspace.  The Pentagon has invested tens of 
billions of dollars in automated information systems (AISs) to gather, store, process, and 
disseminate mission-critical information. The LMP is the U.S. Army’s latest AIS, and its 
purpose is to manage the key logistical needs of the Department of Defense (DoD).  The JMC is 
deeply involved in that logistics mission by providing conventional ammunition to the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines, and it seeks to leverage the LMP to optimize its capabilities by 
placing the lowest possible burden on taxpayers.  However, the LMP is only as useful as the data 
it possesses.  With so much riding on the viability of the LMP, achieving and maintaining quality 
data is imperative.  The author’s primary aim in this research is to increase understanding about 
how the JMC can improve its business processes to properly manage data quality and realize the 
full potential of what the LMP can do. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The JMC collects data quality measurements on several business elements across its 
enterprise.  Assuming that the organizational processes are the same for each business element, 
performing an analysis of each business element would be superfluous.  For this reason the 
author chose to examine only one element: the BOM.  Additionally, since the JMC has only been 
fielded with the LMP since October 2010, the amount of audit data is limited in depth.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
The author began this research by contacting the director of the JMC Enterprise 
Integration Data Team and requesting access to the team’s SharePoint server.  With this access, 
the author downloaded the data quality scorecards from previous audits of the major commands 
within the JMC.  The author did not know of the existence of this data at the beginning of this 
project, and it was helpful in furthering this research.  The data served as a means of quantifying 
the accuracy of BOM records and provided insight into the immediate causes of defective data.  
The author then categorized these causes as training, policy, or process related in order to 
develop strategies for reducing the data defects. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
This joint applied project is composed of five chapters.  Chapter I contains the purpose of 
the research, the research questions, the benefits of the research, the limitations of the research, 
and the research methodology. Chapter II is a literature review in which the author touches on 
training issues raised by a GAO report and then discusses documentation and research published 
with regards to innovative approaches to training, which this study finds is a factor in improving 
data quality.  In Chapter II the author also presents an overview of the various missions of the 
JMC component organizations, background on the LMP, an overview of data quality, and the 
methodology of conducting an audit.  In Chapter III the author presents the scorecard and audit 
data.  In Chapter IV the author provides analysis of this data.  In Chapter V the author 
summarizes the findings and provides recommendations. 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter the author provided an overview of what this project seeks to accomplish 
and tried to convince the reader of how important data quality is to the mission of the JMC and 
to the U.S. armed forces at large.  In the next chapter the author presents a literature review and 
the background information necessary to highlight the importance of this subject matter. 
  4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The GAO is an independent agency of the U.S. government that performs investigations 
on other agencies of the federal government.  One of the GAO’s specific purposes is to 
determine how efficiently government programs are executed. To learn more about the status of 
the Army’s implementation of the LMP, the author studied GAO reports on the subject. 
One GAO report the author studied was released in April 2010 and criticized the Army 
because its “training strategy did not effectively provide LMP users the skills necessary to 
perform their new tasks” (p. 2).  The report further claimed, “Users at the depots stated that the 
training they received did not provide a realistic environment that showed them how to perform 
their expected duties and did not always match their new responsibilities”(p. 2). 
Aspects of the LMP influenced by humans, such as training on how to input data, can 
have a profound impact on data quality because of the risk of human error.  If the source data is 
incorrect or missing, the subsequent data created by the LMP will be flawed and of a low quality.  
Based on this reality, the author examined documentation and published research on innovative 
training strategies in order to establish a foundation for this research. 
B. BLENDED LEARNING TRAINING 
With the development of any new system, whether it’s a stealth bomber or an enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) system, any human interaction with the system requires a training 
strategy.  One innovative strategy is called blended learning.  Instead of solely using the 
traditional brick-and-mortar classroom, blended learning fuses traditional learning with a 
combination of methods, including digital and web-based instruction.  The result is a richness of 
learning that exceeds what any one method could yield on its own.  In fact, students who mix 
online learning with traditional coursework in a blended learning approach have shown increased 
learning over students who attend traditional brick-and-mortar schools (Means, Toyama, 
Murphy, Bakia, Jones, 2010). 
As described by Plifka (2011), blended learning has four main areas of instruction: face-
to-face (F2F), print, digital, and web.  It allows for each area to have subordinate methods of 
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instruction that can also be blended.  These subordinate methods may include distance learning, 
distributed learning, or traditional learning, just to name a few (see Appendix, Figure 1; Plifka, 
2011). 
According to Plifka (2011, p. 15), “it is important to know all of these methods of 
instruction to fully grasp the possible [blended learning] combinations that can be used to create 
the most effective training program.”  Plifka continues, “it is also important to take into 
consideration the objective of the course or program, faculty expertise, student ability, and the 
infrastructure and available resources of the organization” (2011, p. 15). 
The advantages of blended learning include the following: 
• enhanced opportunities for teacher-student interaction and increased student 
engagement in learning through a plurality of mediums;  
• greater flexibility and access for students through the incorporation of distance 
and web-based instruction; and 
• greater opportunity to provide students basic information early via web-based 
instruction in advance of more detailed classroom training. (Plifka, 2011) 
In addition to these advantages, blended learning is compatible with the Army’s interest 
in training strategies that are meant to “optimize, synchronize, and support training in schools 
and in units, and to promote self-development training in order to produce forces capable of 
responding across the spectrum of operations” (Department of the Army, 2007, page 2). 
The LMP training that Army depot employees received was given within the structure of 
a traditional classroom, and the allotted class time and course format did not allow students to be 
instructed on basic concepts about the LMP and how it applied to their job.  Had the blended 
learning approach been utilized, many fundamental aspects of the LMP could have been learned 
via web-based classes during which individual users could have digested elementary material at 
their own pace as a precursor to more in-depth, hands-on training  in either a classroom or venue 
that approximated the real-world work environment of the user. 
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C. THE ARMY LEARNING CONCEPT 2015 
The concepts contained in the Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015) is similar to 
blended learning in that it makes use of multiple training methods, but its focus is on being 
learner-centric.   In other words, ALC 2015 puts the emphasis on adapting the training 
methodology to the needs and learning strengths of the individual student.   This strategic 
training initiative is described in detail in United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-2 (2011), and is a product of the TRADOC, which is a major 
command of the U.S. Army responsible for overseeing the training of Army forces (TRADOC, 
n.d.; see Appendix, Figure 2). 
ALC 2015 (TRADOC, 2011) was developed in response to the training challenges 
presented by a population of personnel composed of a diverse mix of ethnic backgrounds, 
generations, sociological backgrounds, and levels of education.  The ALC 2015 strategy 
acknowledges that American society is producing a generation of citizenry—from which the 
Army will draw the soldiers of tomorrow—that will have significant knowledge gaps in reading, 
writing, mathematics, and other important areas due to failures of the U.S. educational system.  
Given that the Army must be capable of fielding a force that can defeat any adversary, it is 
incumbent upon the Army to develop a strategy of quickly and effectively training its personnel 
in a manner that accommodates the capabilities of the individual learner. 
Table 1 contains a succinct comparison between traditional training strategies and those 
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Table 1.   Comparison Between Traditional Training Strategies and ALC 2015 Strategies 
Traditional Training Strategy ALC 2015 Strategy 
Instructor-led and structured in a 
predetermined fashion that is inflexible for 
meeting individual learner needs 
“Possesses an infrastructure that is 
composed of subject-matter experts and 
facilitators from the centers of excellence , 
a digitized learning media production 
capability, knowledge management 
structures, and policies and resourcing 
models that are flexible enough to adapt to 
shifting operational and learner demands” 
(TRADOC, 2011) 
Based on individual tasks, conditions, and 
standards, and primarily delivers only 
concepts and knowledge 
Promotes learning “ through outcome-
oriented instructional strategies that foster 
thinking, nurture initiative, and provide 
operationally relevant context” (TRADOC, 
2011) 
Rigidly formatted programs of instruction 
(POIs) that do not readily allow for the 
reflection or repetition needed to process 
fundamental information 
Provides a learner-centric framework that 
is “continuously accessible and provides 
learning at the point of need in the learner’s 
career” 
 
Learning process begins before initial 
military training and continues throughout 
a learner’s career via digitized learning 
content (TRADOC, 2011) 
Lecture-based instruction that is oftentimes 
passive, one-way communication and that 
does not integrate the accumulated 
knowledge of learners’ past experiences 
Provides students with challenging content 
through a mixture of live teaching and 
technology in variety of venues 
 
Incentivizes individuals to pursue learning 
that supports position assignments and 
career goals (TRADOC, 2011) 
 
In short, there are two major goals of the ALC 2015 (TRADOC, 2011).  One is to 
improve training through “outcome-oriented instructional strategies that foster thinking, nurture 
initiative, and provide operationally relevant context” (TRADOC, 2011, p.21).  The other is to 
extend this richer learning experience throughout the careers of personnel by making it 
constantly available via network technologies so that previously learned content is always readily 
accessible. 
The training associated with the LMP was given within a traditional format.  Army depot 
employees would have received an enhanced learning experience if the training had been 
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administered within the framework of the ALC 2015 (TRADOC, 2011) approach.  Students 
would not have been subjugated to the one-size-fits-all approach of traditional teaching methods.  
Instead, the learning environment would have been adapted to a format that would be most 
beneficial to the specific learning needs of individual personnel.  Additionally, as time moves on, 
personnel would continue to have had ready access to previously learned material on an as-
needed basis throughout the balance of their careers.   
D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
In order to properly couch the prior discussion on training strategies within the context of 
the LMP, it is beneficial to discuss how and why the LMP was developed.  Prior to the LMP, for 
about 30 years the Army had used the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) and the 
Standard Depot System (SDS) to support the Army’s procurement of supplies and equipment.  
These systems were managed by the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM;  Hill, 
2007, p. 47).  Though useful, these systems were not as capable as state-of-the-art logistical 
planning systems being developed and implemented in private industry. 
In 1997, two important documents were created that would set the DoD on a path toward 
the eventual creation of the LMP.  The first document was the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 1997a).  In the Quadrennial Defense Review a 
military asset management plan was described that emphasized “focused Logistics” (OSD, 
1997a, p. 4).  This plan articulated DoD intentions to take advantage of information technology 
breakthroughs in the civilian sector and apply those technologies within the DoD to radically 
improve supply chain management.  The second document was the 1997 Defense Reform 
Initiative (DRI), chartered by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.   Its purpose was to study 
changes that the DoD needed to make to its business processes in order to become more 
efficient.  The initiative also “authorized the services and DOD support agencies to begin IT 
projects to acquire systems that will help the Department perform ‘just-in-time’ logistics” (Hill, 
2007, p. 47). 
That same year, in response to the DRI, a CECOM project team was charged with 
assessing SDS and CCSS.  Hill provides the following list of conclusions about the team’s 
assessment of the weaknesses of SDS and CCSS: 
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• Lack of flexibility: Process changes, regulatory changes, and 
reorganizations within and between user commands require expensive 
and extensive data conversions and programming changes. 
• Slow, unfocused reports: Reporting and summarization capabilities are 
geared to workers. Managers and executives, with their need for easily 
specified, flexible, tailored, and rapid generation of reports and 
summaries are usually frustrated with output capabilities. 
• Difficult to use: The system is not user friendly. The system relies on 
extensive use of codes to provide compact storage (a holdover from the 
time when computer storage was inordinately expensive). Users are 
required to learn codes and have extensive system knowledge. The 
system lacks adequate data edits and validations, as well as support 
functions. 
• Expensive to maintain: The system’s size and complexities make it 
difficult to manage and change code. Large portions are based on 
relatively old third-generation programming languages and flat data 
structures that are inflexible to change and inefficient to operate. 
• Unresponsive: The use of batch processing precludes timely updates to 
data architecture, flexible data retrieval capabilities, and informed 
decision-making. 
• Outmoded database: The use of outmoded database systems and 
architecture result in rampant data inconsistencies, data duplication, and 
the lack of data standardization. 
• Expensive to operate: The system requires extensive manual 
intervention because of outmoded data and system architectures. 
• Lack of cost-sharing: The Army is the only “bill payer,” precluding the 
ability to leverage existing industry investments in modern logistics 
processes and IT. (Hill, 2007, p. 47) 
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The CECOM project team also recommended that the AMC outsource the development 
of a replacement system based on specific performance requirements that would address the 
shortcomings of SDS and CCSS.  Because the development was inherently an outsourcing 
activity, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the project team to follow Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 guidelines.  After a period of deliberation 
between the offices of the primary stakeholders (which included the National Federation of 
Federal Employees [NFFE] and the AMC Commanding General), the Secretary of the Army 
finally granted the AMC the authorization to move forward on the outsourcing procurement.  On 
December 30, 1999, the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) was awarded a contract to 
develop a system for replacing SDS and CCSS. That system came to be known as the Logistics 
Modernization Program (Hill, 2007, p. 48). 
Upon contract award, CSC immediately went to work on the LMP, and by November 
2002 end user training and testing was underway, with the testing designed to determine if the 
LMP met the requirements established for it by the AMC (Caterinicchia, 2002).  Having passed 
the initial testing, the first LMP deployment occurred in February 2003.  In October 2010 the 
final LMP deployment was fielded to the JMC.  However, a variety of factors have prevented the 
JMC from fully benefiting from the LMP’s promised functionality, not the least of which has 
been the fight to achieve and maintain data quality.   
E. DATA QUALITY DESCRIPTION 
In order to understand data quality, it must first be established that its nature is both 
multidimensional and hierarchical.  These characteristics are most evident when one considers 
that first and foremost, the data must be accessible.  Second, the data must be interpretable.  
Third, the data must be useful.  Finally, the data must be believable.  These basic requirements 
form the primary dimensions of data quality (Wang, Reddy, & Kon, 1992). 
When considering the accessible dimension, at least one prerequisite is the need for the 
data to be available.  Likewise, in order to have useful data, it must first be relevant.  The 
relationships among these dimensions and sub-dimensions are depicted (see Appendix, Figure 3, 
Wang et al., 1992).  
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The multidimensional and hierarchical nature of data quality provides a conceptual 
framework for understanding the characteristics that define data quality. In this research project 
completeness and accuracy are the relevant dimensions for assessing the quality of data obtained 
by the JMC Enterprise Integration Data Team.  Component organizations of the JMC generate 
the data quality scores as one measure of how well they are executing their missions.  
F. MISSIONS OF THE JMC COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS  
The value of the data being utilized within the JMC is tied to the missions performed by 
the component organizations.  Therefore, any discussion about the quality of data would be 
incomplete without at least a brief overview of those missions.  The following sections 
summarize the missions of JMC component organizations whose BOM data was used in this 
research. 
1. Blue Grass Army Depot 
Located in Richmond, Kentucky, Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) is a “Strategic 
Mobility Power Projection ammunition depot and the primary Southeast Regional Distribution 
Point for all Department of Defense (DOD) munitions” (BGAD, n.d.)  Sitting on over 14,000 
acres and possessing a storage capacity of over 3 million square feet, it supports the DoD 
through the receipt, storage, maintenance, shipping, and demilitarization of a vast variety of 
standard and non-standard ammunition (BGAD, n.d.). 
2. Letterkenny Munitions Center 
Letterkenny Munitions Center is a tenant of Letterkenny Army Depot and located in 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.  Occupying about 16,000 acres, it’s a Strategic Mobility Platform, 
specializing in the receipt, storage, and maintenance of a variety of Army, Air Force, and Navy 
missiles systems.  These systems include the Sidewinder, Sparrow, High-speed Anti-radiation 
Missile (HARM), Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), and the Advanced Medium 
Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM; Crane Army Ammunition Activity, n.d.-b). 
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3. McAlester Army Ammunition Plant 
Located in McAlester, Oklahoma, McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) is the 
DoD’s premier facility for loading bombs with energetics such as TNT.  Covering 44,964 acres 
and with a storage capacity of over 8.8 million square feet, it shares many of the capabilities of 
BGAD in that it receives stores, maintains, ships and demilitarizes a huge variety of munitions 
(MCAAP, n.d.). 
4. Tooele Army Depot 
Tooele Army Depot is located in Tooele, Utah.  Occupying 23,610 acres and possessing 
more than 2.4 million square feet of storage space, its mission is similar to that of BGAD and 
MCAAP in that it receives, stores, maintains, ships, and demilitarizes munitions.  But unlike the 
other components it also designs, manufactures, and supports the special equipment needed to 
perform ammunition maintenance and demilitarization activities (Tooele Army Depot, n.d.). 
5. Crane Army Ammunition Activity 
As a tenant of the Navy Region Midwest, Naval Support Activity, Crane Army 
Ammunition Activity is located in Crane, Indiana.  It occupies more than 51,000 acres and can 
store 650,000 tons of ammunition related stock.  Like BGAD and MCAAP, its primary mission 
is to receive, store, ship, produce, renovate, and demilitarize conventional ammunition (Crane 
Army Ammunition Activity, n.d.-a). 
6. Pine Bluff Arsenal 
Located in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, Pine Bluff Arsenal’s primary mission is the production 
of smoke, incendiary, and pyrotechnic munitions and devices.  It also tests chemical defense 
clothing (Bearden, 2012). 
G. BILLS OF MATERIAL DATA QUALITY AUDIT PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
As the aforementioned components of the JMC execute their assigned missions, they 
have the responsibility of achieving and maintaining data quality goals, as well as performing 
data quality audits. However, the management of the overall data quality program belongs to the 
JMC Enterprise Integration Data Team.  
  14 
Before an audit begins, the JMC Enterprise Integration Data Team notifies the BOM 
business process owner (BPO) of each component organization and sends a standardized JMC 
data accuracy scorecard with which to conduct the audit.  Currently, the scorecard is a 
customized spreadsheet. 
During the first phase of the audit, the BPOs check each of the LMP BOM records 
according to the completeness and accuracy of 13 data elements.  These elements consist of 
BOM usage, base quantity, valid-from date, item category, BOM component, component 
quantity, component unit of measure, explosive type, inductive recursiveness allowed, inductive 
relevancy to costing, issue location, component supply area, and special process type.  During 
the audit, records found with at least one incorrect element are designated “fail.”  Alternatively, 
if all elements of a record are determined to be correct, the record receives a “pass.” 
As the first phase is being completed, the scorecard automatically populates a data 
summary that displays critical metrics such as audit date, total BOMs audited, total BOMs 
passed, total BOMs failed, percent accuracy, percent accuracy target, defect quantities by critical 
data element, total defects, and defects per defective record. 
During the second phase, the BPO and subordinate personnel identify the root causes of 
the failures as well as corrective actions that should prevent failure reoccurrence.   Both failures 
and corrective actions are then recorded directly into the scorecard. 
Once the audit is complete, the BOM records and audit findings are submitted to the JMC 
Enterprise Integration Data Team for validation.  After the results are validated, the scorecards 
are posted on the JMC Enterprise Integration Data Team’s SharePoint site and retained by the 
team to use on subsequent audits (R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012). 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter the author began with a literature review that included a discussion on 
innovative training strategies. That discussion stemmed from a 2010 GAO report that was critical 
of how the Army trained its personnel for using the LMP.  Afterwards, the author discussed the 
development of the LMP, the nature of data quality, and the missions of JMC component 
organizations. The author wrapped up the chapter with an overview of the data audit process.  In 
Chapter III, the author displays BOM defect data from six major components of the JMC. 
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III. BOM DEFECT DATA SUMMARY 
In order to respect confidentiality, direct references to specific organizations have 
been changed to the generalized names of Component A, Component B, and so forth.  
The defect data in Tables 2–7 originated from scorecards published by the JMC 
Enterprise Integration Data Team (R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012). 
Tables 8–13 and Figures 4–10 were created using data from the same scorecards. The 
author added the qualification data in the table columns labeled “category.”  The 
qualification data was also used in the figures.  For the sake of authenticity, error and root 
cause descriptions were taken verbatim from the scorecards. 
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A. SCORECARD DEFECT DATA 
Table 2.   Defect Data for Component A (From: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
DATA OBJECT ACCURACY SUMMARY 
 
  
DEFECT QUANTITIES BY CRITICAL DATA ELEMENT 
     
   
               
     


































































































































































9/7/2011 370 73 297 19.7% 98.0%   46 0 0 45 0 0 0 141 1 9 101 899 3 1,245 4.2 
 
Note. The data in this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint website (R. Fuller, personal 
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Table 3.   Defect Data for Component B (From: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
DATA OBJECT ACCURACY SUMMARY 
 
  
DEFECT QUANTITIES BY CRITICAL DATA ELEMENT 
     
   
               
     


































































































































































2/2/2012 133 99 34 74.4% 98.0%   13 0 0 0 4 0 0 17 0 59 30 0 14 137 4 
9/26/2011 155 58 97 37.4% 98.0%   
16
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 21 21 16 
19
0 0 452 4.7 
 
Note. The data in this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint website (R. Fuller, personal 








  18 
Table 4.   Defect Data for Component C (From: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
DATA OBJECT ACCURACY SUMMARY 
 
  
DEFECT QUANTITIES BY CRITICAL DATA ELEMENT 
     
   
               
     


































































































































































3/29/2012 247 246 1 99.6% 98.0%   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 3 
2/2/2012 210 194 16 92.4% 98.0%   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 49 7 21 0 84 5.3 
9/27/2011 199 177 22 88.9% 98.0% 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 3 31 16 40 0 117 5.3 
9/13/2011 199 199 0 100% 98.0% 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Note. The data in this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint website (R. Fuller, personal 
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Table 5.   Defect Data for Component D (From: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
DATA OBJECT ACCURACY SUMMARY 
 
  
DEFECT QUANTITIES BY CRITICAL DATA ELEMENT 
     
   
               
     


































































































































































5/24/2012 135 131 4 97.0% 98.0%   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 1.0 
1/11/2012 131 130 4 99.2% 98.0%   0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.0 
9/13/2011 195 183 12 93.8% 98.0% 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 16 0 24 2.0 
 
Note. The data in this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint website (R. Fuller, personal 
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Table 6.   Defect Data for Component E (From: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
DATA OBJECT ACCURACY SUMMARY 
 
  
DEFECT QUANTITIES BY CRITICAL DATA ELEMENT 
     
   
               
     


































































































































































10/24/2011 85 58 27 68.2% 98.0%   1 1 1 1 40 27 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 81 3 
 
Note. The data in this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint website (R. Fuller, personal 








  21 
Table 7.   Defect Data for Component F (From: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
DATA OBJECT ACCURACY SUMMARY 
 
  
DEFECT QUANTITIES BY CRITICAL DATA ELEMENT 
     
   
               
     


































































































































































11/22/2011 123 123 4 100.0% 98.0%   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
11/4/2011 741 740 4 99.9% 98.0%   0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2.0 
9/30/2011 741 168 573 22.7% 98.0% 
 
0 2 0 90 2 5 0 200 0 0 249 0 1,577 2,125 3.7 
 
Note. The data in this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint website (R. Fuller, personal 
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B. DEFECT DATA QUALIFIED BY CATEGORY 
 
Table 8.   Defect Qualification Data for Component A (After: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
 
Note. The data in the first four columns of this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint 












Data Element Error Description Root Cause Category Qty 
9/7/2011 BOM Usage BOM Usage cCode "R" Change in BOM business rules after originally built Policy 46 
9/7/2011 Item Category Code "Y" Personnel was not fully educated at time of creation of BOMs. 
JM&L BOM process has changed since go-live.  Should have 
been "L" or "N" Training 45 
9/7/2011 Explosive Type Blank or incorrect type Change in business rules and not understanding how each tyoe 
worked with Planning MRP/Inventory Training 141 
9/7/2011 Ind-Recursiveness-
Allowed  
Entered wrong data Did not properly mark Demil component for recursiveness 
Training 1 
9/7/2011 Ind-Relevancy-to-Costing Entered incorrect data or left blank No standard business rule for relevancy costing at time of 
creation Policy 9 
9/7/2011 Issue-Location Storage Location Left Blank Personnel did not enter storage location Training 101 
9/7/2011 Component-Supply-Area Left Blank Personnel did not enter Supply Area Training 899 
9/7/2011 Special-Proc-Type Incorrect data Lack of knowledge when creating BOM Training 3 
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Table 9.   Defect Qualification Data for Component B (After: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
Audit Date Data Element Error Description Root Cause Category Qty 
9/26/2011 Component-Supply-Area Supply Area Blank or incorrect Inadequate guidance, was not initially required to be 
populated Training 190 
9/26/2011 BOM-Usage Actually Incorrect BOM Status Inactive BOMs that were marked as active, human 
error Training 165 
9/26/2011 Explosion-Type Left Blank Operator error, not marked when making the BOM Training 39 
9/26/2011 Ind-Recursiveness-
Allowed  




(16) Flagged as recursive, if not causes error 
in production results 
Business process changed, recursive required for 
correct production results, does not fit with business 
rules Policy 16 
9/26/2011 Ind-Relevancy-to-Costing Incorrectly flagged for Costing Setup according to initial guidance not updated, 
business process changed not updated during change Policy 21 
9/26/2011 Issue-Location Left Blank Changed business process, not updated during change Policy 16 
2/2/2012 Component Supply Area Supply Area Blank or incorrect on BOMs Guidance received included placing PSA on work 
centers, this does not show on the BOM audits, per 
JM&L guidance not to be counted as a BOM audit error Policy 8 
2/2/2012 Ind-Relevancy-to-Costing Incorrectly identified for Costing Based on MRP running and changes resulting from 
eliminating recursiveness, not all BOM components had 
been updated  Process 59 
2/2/2012 Issue-Location Incorrect value or left blank  WH location not reviewed and added or updated while 
preparing for MRP  Training 30 
2/2/2012 Explosion-Type Left Blank Operator error, not marked when making the BOM Training 17 
2/2/2012 Special Procument Type Incorrect value or left blank  As a result of recursive changes and MRP being run, 
BOMs were revised, not all corrections made Process 14 
2/2/2012 BOM-Usage Actually Incorrect BOM Status As a result of recursive changes and MRP being run, 
BOMs were not revised to be inactive, human error Process 13 
2/2/2012 BOM-Component Components not deleted from BOM As a result of recursive changes and MRP being run, 
BOMs were changed and components were not 
deleted from the BOM, human error Process 4 
 
Note: The data in the first four columns of this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint 
website (R. Fuller, personal communication June 19, 2012). 
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Table 10.   Defect Qualification Data for Component C (After: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
Audit 
Date 
Data Element Error Description Root Cause Category Qty 
9/27/2011 Component supply 
area 
should be blank for all negative quantities error due to new/updated JM&L business rules 
Policy 40 
9/27/2011 relevancy to costing Not cost relevant for negetive quantities error due to new/updated JM&L business rules Policy 31 
9/27/2011 explosion type should be marked as R2 error due to new/updated JM&L business rules Policy 27 
9/27/2011 issue location blanks not allowed  error due to new/updated JM&L business rules Policy 16 
9/27/2011 recursiveness allowed recursiveness not allowed for negetive 
quantities 
error due to new/updated JM&L business rules 
Policy 3 
2/2/2012 explosion type should be marked as R2 for non-text 
components 
human error  
Training 7 
2/2/2012 relevancy to costing Not cost relevant for negetive quantities human error  Training 49 
2/2/2012 issue location blanks not allowed for non-text components human error  Training 7 
2/2/2012 supply area should be blank for all negetive quantities human error  Training 21 
3/29/2012 relevancy to costing Not cost relevant for negetive quantities human error  Training 3 
 
Note: The data in the first four columns of this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint 
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Table 11.   Defect Qualification Data for Component D (After: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
Audit 
Date 
Data Element Error Description Root Cause Category Qty 
9/13/2011 Component Supply Area Incorrect supply area Definition was changed during the audit;  
Data was correct at time of audit but not 
at time of data pull 
Policy 16 
9/13/2011 Costing Does not show costing relevancy Human error; planner entered incorrect 
data when building BOM 
Training 4 
9/13/2011 Unit of Measure Material master error Cataloging error in legacy data Process 3 
9/13/2011 Explosive Type Incorrect explosive type Explanation of difference between R1 
and R2 was unclear, resulting in error 
when building BOM Training 1 
1/11/2012 Component - Quantity Value listed as a positive number instead 
of negative number 
Making corrections to the unit of 
measure in the baseline audit caused the 
change in the component quantity critical 
element Training 1 
 
Note: The data in the first four columns of this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint 
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Table 12.   Defect Qualification Data for Component E (After: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
Audit Date Data Element Error Description Root Cause Category Qty 
10/24/2011 BOM Component Components were deleted or added BOM changes were not communicated to the LMP 
workers Process 40 
10/24/2011 Component Qty Qty of tape was fine-tuned or usage factors were 
inserted into RBOMs (TACOM workload) 
Paying closer attention to processes but not 
communicating to the LMP workers Training 27 
10/24/2011 Issue Location Blank when should not have been Requirement to have this set, not widely 
communicated Process 1 
10/24/2011 BOM Usage Component was deleted so SME marked all fields Ambiguous issue, should all be marked F if 
component is deleted or added; regular DQ lead 
gone for 1 wk and fill-in not familiar with audits 
(many hats, less heads) 
Training 1 
10/24/2011 Base Qty Component was deleted so SME marked all fields Training 1 
10/24/2011 Valid from Date Component was deleted so SME marked all fields Training 1 
10/24/2011 Item Category Component was deleted so SME marked all fields Training 1 
10/24/2011 C-UOM Component was deleted so SME marked all fields Training 1 
10/24/2011 Explosion Type Component was deleted so SME marked all fields Training 1 
 
Note: The data in the first four columns of this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint 
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Table 13.   Defect Qualification Data for Component F (After: R. Fuller, personal communication, June 19, 2012) 
Audit 
Date 
Data Element Error Description Root Cause Category Qty 
9/30/2011 Base Quantity Initial input was for total number of parts generated 
from a bar of  aluminum for a grenade tops and 
bottoms project  
Input was from Oct 1, 2009; initial learning phase 
Training 2 
9/30/2011 Item Category N entered; Should be L N  Non-Stock L Stock  Incorrect input. Confusion on 
what should be entered. All errors are basically 
from 2 BOM's and 2 dates. This error was noted 
prior to audit because of issues related to MRP. 
Training 90 
9/30/2011 BOM Component Wrong Part Number entered Typographical error Process 2 
9/30/2011 ExplosionType Missing ExplosiveType. Should read R2 Majority of errors from 5 Bombs and 5 dates; lack 
of user knowledge Training 200 
9/30/2011 Issue Storage 
Location 
Missing Issue Location. Should read WH01 or 
WH05 
Majority of errors were conducted on 5 dates; lack 
of user knowledge Training 249 
9/30/2011 Supply Area Missing Component Supply Area. For example 
should read 059400-05B or 059400-01B 
This seems to be a systemic problem. This was a 
late requirement that was handed down in late 
August/September 2010. Many BOMs were built 
prior to guidance and have not been changed. Also 
issue with user knowledge. Policy 1577 
9/30/2011 Component Quantity Incorrect Quantity for what is required Typographical error Process 5 
11/4/2011 BOM Component   Pending Material Master typographical error 
confirmation. Possible data pull anomaly. Actual 
BOM reflects correct material numbers. 
Process 2 
 
Note: The data in the first four columns of this table was taken from scorecards the author was given access to on the JMC Data Quality Team's SharePoint 
website (R. Fuller, personal communication June 19, 2012). 
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C. DEFECT TRENDS DATA 
 
Figure 1.   Component A Defects by Category 
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Figure 3.   Component C Defects by Category 
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Figure 5.   Component E Defects by Category 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. DATA QUALIFICATION 
The data in Tables 2–7 comes directly from scorecards generated by the 
component organizations of the JMC.  The benefit of these tables is that they allow the 
reader to see the types and number of defects for each audit that was conducted.  For 
example, in Table 3 the data shows that on September 26, 2011, Component B conducted 
an audit of 155 BOMs.  Within those BOMs, a total of 452 defects were found.  Of those 
defects, none were with the special process data element; however, there were 190 
defects associated with the component supply data element.  At the next audit on 
February 2, 2012, 133 BOMs were audited and a total of 137 defects were found.  Of 
those defects, 14 were special process type defects and there were no component supply 
defects. 
Based on these observations, it is evident that although the total number of defects 
dropped at the second audit, the reduction did not extend consistently to all the data 
elements.  For example, the special process type defects actually increased by 14, while 
the component supply defects dropped from 190 to 0.  It is clear that some degree of 
defect qualification is needed to obtain anything meaningful from this data. 
Tables 8–13 incorporate BPO input in the error description and root cause 
columns that introduce the first level of qualification.  The information is particularly 
useful in that it provides tactical-level reasons why defects occurred.  For example, the 
data in Table 3 shows that there were 39 explosive-type defects from the September 26 
audit of Component B, but in the error description and root cause columns of Table 9, the 
data indicates that those defects were due to blank data fields that were not marked as the 
BOM was being created. 
Possessing the degree of detail shown in Tables 8-13 is helpful in identifying 
defect causes.  However, the specificity of the defect causes hindered the author from 
performing a meaningful analysis.  The author also reasoned that the development of a 
strategy for eventually reducing defects would require a higher level of qualification. It 
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was therefore necessary to further qualify the data by grouping the root causes into 
descriptive categories.  In surveying the root causes, the author observed that they could 
be grouped into three categories: training, process, and policy.  For example, the 
aforementioned 39 explosive-type defects that had unmarked data fields were categorized 
as training because JMC personnel presumably did not know the required documentation 
procedure and lacked adequate training.  In another instance on Table 9, the 13 BOM 
usage defects were categorized as process because the root cause information showed 
that the defects could have been prevented had the BPO implemented a procedure 
requiring the removal of obsolete components whenever the MRP was implemented.  In 
still another example, 21 inductive relevancy to costing defects were categorized as 
policy because the root cause description indicated a level of uncertainty regarding the 
application of business rules.  Although this categorization method is not an exact 
science, the author believes that enough information is present in the data to adequately 
delineate between the categories without introducing significant amounts of subjectivity. 
B. DATA TRENDS 
With the data qualified into three different categories, seeing the trends and 
patterns is a much more obvious exercise.  Figures 4–9 show the qualified defects by 
quantity and the audit dates for each of the six components of the JMC, and Figure 10 
gives a similar but more cumulative look at data defects. 
1. Training 
As was no surprise, inadequate training was the greatest overall source of data 
defects, as seen in Figure 10.  The 2010 GAO report referenced in Chapter II linked 
training with data quality.   However, it was interesting to notice how quickly the training 
defects decreased with subsequent audits.  The only exception to this trend of decreasing 
defects was observed in Figure 6 with Component C. This indicates that significant 
learning may be happening through the auditing process rather than through the training 
processes.  While it is certainly commendable to learn from the audits, the audit process 
is designed to gain status and not provide training.  Because of this, the declining trend in 
training-related data defects may not be an indicator that the actual training has improved. 
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2. Policy 
Policy-related defects were surprisingly the second highest source of data defects, 
not far behind training-related defects.  In Components C, D, and F, policy was actually 
the leading cause of defects.  Like training, policy-related defects tended to decrease with 
subsequent audits.  This is indicative of component organizations that initially had 
shifting, non-existent, or amorphous policies concerning the management of BOM data 
within the LMP. At some later point, perhaps in part due to audits, these organizations 
developed workable policies.  This point is especially clear in Table 13, which shows that 
1,577 policy defects were attributed to a policy change that apparently occurred after the 
BOMs were already built. 
3. Process 
The author anticipated that process-related issues were a significant source of 
defects. In Component E, process defects were in fact the largest source of data defects.  
However, in all the other components defects directly related to process issues were 
virtually non-factors.  Considering that the sample size for Component E was relatively 
small, the high number of process defects observed could easily have been an outlier.  
Although the author did not observe a direct connection between process and data 
defects, the analysis does indicate an indirect relationship by way of training and policy 
issues.  Study of the training and policy defect data indicates that improving the internal 
processes inherent to training and policy development can present opportunities to reduce 
data defects.  For example, in Table 13 the 541 training defects of Component F could 
possibly have been avoided if Component F had implemented a process for assessing and 
addressing the knowledge gaps of each user providing inputs to BOM data.  A similar 
point can be made regarding the need for a process that synthesizes the best data 
management policies.  Additionally, there is a need for a better process of updating and 
communicating policy changes as conditions warrant. 
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C. APPLICATION WITHIN THE LMP 
Up to this point, the discussion has centered primarily around data quality within 
the LMP.  By focusing on such a narrow topic, the bigger picture of data quality’s 
significance within the LMP should be clarified. The life blood of any AIS is the 
information within it.  No matter how impressive the processing power, memory, 
bandwidth, or any other system specification, the system as a whole is of little value 
without data.  To take this point a step further, even if a highly capable AIS has data, the 
system is still of little value unless the data is of good quality—meaning that it is 
accurate, accessible, believable, useful, and so forth.  As the Army’s latest major AIS, the 
LMP is utilized by the JMC to manage over $30 billion in weaponry, as well as the 
supporting structure of multiple thousands of people and facilities spread across several 
states—a mission that is desperately dependent upon quality data. 
An example will help to illustrate the link between data quality and a typical JMC 
operation.  The 105mm round is a popular munition used by the Army, Air Force, and 
Marines.  The MCAAP is one of a few components of the JMC that stores tens of 
thousands of 105mm rounds. In this example, the JMC provided funds to the MCAAP to 
renovate a special variant of the 105mm round that was urgently needed to support 
operations in Afghanistan.  A crucial part of the renovation process is replacing non-
serviceable 105mm round components.  These components are listed on a 105mm round 
BOM.  One of those components that typically needs replacement is the fuze.  In this 
example, an ammunition planner—who is also an LMP user—mistakenly overwrites the 
unit of measure element for the fuze on the BOM as pallets whereas it should be as each.  
In doing so, the ammunition planner unknowingly created defective data.  This defective 
BOM data was passed along to other LMP users, such as to the procurement personnel 
who order supplies.  In this case, due to the defective unit of measure used for the fuze, 
the procurement personnel failed to order enough fuzes to service all the rounds the 
MCAAP was funded to perform.  The immediate consequence was that the 105mm 
renovation line came to a halt once the fuzes run out and did not restart until more fuzes 
were ordered, produced, shipped, delivered, and received—a process that takes about a 
month.  In turn, this resulted in either the Afghanistan mission being delayed by a month, 
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or in the warfighters having to resort to riskier contingency plans to carry out their 
missions, which increased the likelihood of mission failure and casualties.  In this 
business, data quality matters. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In conclusion, this study provides insight into how the JMC can significantly 
improve data quality in its component organizations.  Based on the data analyzed in this 
thesis, there must be a strategic focus on improving training and policy formulation.  
Furthermore, the JMC must invest effort into the development of solid internal processes 
for supporting training and policy management since processes appear to have an indirect 
impact on data quality within the LMP. 
A. TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this study has shown, the training approach provided by the Army was 
inadequate.  The fact that subsequent audits showed significant reductions in data defects 
suggests that alternative forms of training must have occurred within the various 
components of the JMC.  It is therefore recommended that the Army adopt learner-centric 
training strategies and utilize them to educate new users of the LMP, as well as to meet 
the training needs of users with varying levels of experience.  The training program 
should be fully compliant with the concepts of the ALC 2015 (TRADOC, 2011) strategy 
that was discussed in Chapter II. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
One particularly troublesome aspect of policy defects is that no matter how well 
the users are trained, a shifting policy, a poor policy, or a formerly good policy that no 
longer serves the interests of the mission based on changing conditions can have a hugely 
negative impact on data quality.  Based on the findings of this study, the JMC must be 
vigilant in defining, implementing, communicating, and maintaining its policies related to 
the usage of the LMP.  With so many components and subcomponents, it would be very 
easy for the JMC to become parochialized regarding the LMP.  A stovepiped approach 
would undermine its effectiveness. 
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C. PROCESS RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to carry out the training and policy recommendations they must each be 
undergirded with solid processes.  The training processes that the JMC should develop 
must be apt at assessing the training needs of the LMP users and systematically 
delivering them knowledge that is both accurate and pertinent to their jobs on a timely 
basis and in a manner that adapts to the individual user’s learning capability.   Likewise, 
the JMC should create processes that support sound policy management.  Policy 
processes should require the thorough review of the impacts of adopting a proposed 
policy as well as the consequences of rejecting it.  Processes that promote comprehensive 
policy reviews should minimize the need for policy changes.  However, when the 
inevitable need for a change occurs, there should be a policy change control process for 
ensuring that the change is executed in a manner that does not create defective data.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
As more audits are conducted, the author hopes that this study will encourage an 
effort to discover more opportunities for reducing data defects within the LMP.  It is 
possible that three categories of qualification is too simplistic and that more defect 
categories are necessary.  As more audit data is captured, and more analysis is conducted, 
time will tell. 
On a final note, the LMP is the system by which the JMC conducts its business.  
Because of the potential downstream effects in terms of money and human lives, the data 
quality within this system is profoundly important. By drawing attention to the 
importance of data quality, this study makes it possible for the Army to improve its 
support of the warfighter. 
 

























































Figure 10.   A Hierarchy of Data Quality Dimensions (After: Wang et al., 1992, p. 3) 
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